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Abstract 
 
We examined 120 trial transcripts of 6- to 12-year-old children testifying to 
sexual abuse. Age and attorney role were analyzed in relation to question types, 
children’s responsiveness, and self-contradiction frequency. A total of 48,716 
question-response pairs were identified. Attorneys used more closed-ended than open-
ended prompts. Prosecutors used more invitations (3% vs. 0%), directives and option-
posing prompts than defence attorneys, who used more suggestive prompts than 
prosecutors. Children were more unresponsive to defence attorneys than to 
prosecutors. Self-contradictions were identified in 95% of the cases. Defence 
attorneys elicited more self-contradictions than prosecutors, but nearly all prosecutors 
(86%) elicited at least one self-contradiction.  Suggestive questions elicited more self-
contradictions than any other prompt type. There were no associations with age. 
These findings suggest that neither prosecutors nor defence attorneys question 
children in developmentally appropriate ways. 
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Question Types, Responsiveness and Self-contradictions When Prosecutors and 
Defence Attorneys Question Alleged Victims of Child Sexual Abuse 
In adversarial jurisdictions, such as the USA, UK and New Zealand, jurors often 
place a strong emphasis on report consistency when assessing the accuracy and 
veracity of oral testimony provided by witnesses (e.g., Bruer & Pozzulo, in press; 
Myers, Redlich, Goodman, Prizmich, & Imwinkelried, 1999; Semmler & Brewer, 
2002). Although inconsistencies are reported by judges to have a small effect on trial 
outcomes (Connolly, Price, & Gordon, 2009), self-contradictory or nonsensical 
responses may affect decisions by reducing children’s testimonial credibility (Home 
Office, 2011, section 2.214).  
Informed by psychological research, best-practice guidelines for forensic 
interviewers discourage the use of techniques (e.g., misleading questions) that might 
undermine children’s consistency (American Professional Society on the Abuse of 
Children [APSAC], 2012; Home Office, 2011, section 3.44; Lamb, Hershkowitz, 
Orbach, & Esplin, 2008). However, very limited guidance exists regarding the ways 
in which attorneys should question children when they are examined and cross-
examined in court. The guidance that does exist is vague, open to interpretation and 
neither well embraced nor empirically supported (see Spencer & Lamb, 2012). For 
example, guidelines in England and Wales state that judges “have a responsibility to 
ensure that all witnesses…are enabled to give their best evidence” (Home Office, 
2011, section 5.8). However, despite recent efforts to change prevailing practices in 
England and Wales (see Criminal Practice Directions, 2013, section 3E.4), defence 
attorneys are permitted to ask children misleading questions in cross-examination to 
test the evidence, a technique that directly contravenes established principles for 
eliciting accurate responses from children (Henderson, 2002) and consequently does 
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not give children the opportunity to “give their best evidence”.	  In the United States, 
judges are similarly expected to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order 
of examining witnesses” so as to “make those procedures effective for determining 
the truth” (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2014, section 611).  Moreover, special 
protections are sometimes provided for child witnesses.  In California, for example, 
judges are expected to “take special care to ensure that questions are stated in a form 
which is appropriate to the age or cognitive level of the witness” (California Evidence 
Code, 2014, section 765).  Nevertheless, attorneys are allowed to ask children leading 
questions when they appear reluctant to respond, and leading questions are routinely 
allowed in cross-examination (Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 2012).  There is, consequently, 
growing international concern as to whether justice can be reliably achieved when 
witnesses are questioned in ways that exploit their immaturity and may thus elicit 
unreliable evidence (see Spencer & Lamb, 2012).  
However, to date there has been no large-scale empirical field research on this 
topic. In the present study, question-response pairs were examined to explore whether 
children’s responsiveness and the consistency of their testimony were affected by the 
types of questions they were asked by both prosecutors and defence attorneys, and 
whether this differed depending on their ages.   
Question Types and Children’s Responses: Lessons from Psychological Research  
The question types used to elicit accounts of children’s experiences affect both 
the quantity and quality of the information obtained (see Saywitz, Lyon, & Goodman, 
2011; Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, in press; Lamb, La Rooy, Malloy, & 
Katz, 2011, for reviews). On the one hand, when questioned with open-ended free-
recall prompts (e.g., “Tell me what happened.”), children provide accounts that may 
be brief but are more likely to be accurate. Additional open-ended prompts can be 
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used to follow-up and thus elicit elaborations or further details (e.g., “You mentioned 
[person/object/action]. Tell me more about that.”; “Then what happened?”). Even 
though younger children may produce shorter and less detailed accounts of 
experienced events in response to open-ended questions than older children and adults 
(e.g., Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, & Crayton, 2007; Hershkowitz, Lamb, Orbach, 
Katz, & Horowitz, 2012; Lamb, Sternberg, Orbach, Esplin, Stewart, & Mitchell, 
2003), their reports are no less accurate (e.g., Jack, Leov, & Zajac, 2014; Sutherland 
& Hayne, 2001). On the other hand, the probability of erroneous responses increases 
considerably when children are questioned using closed-ended recognition prompts 
(e.g., “Did he touch you with his fingers?”; “Was this during the day or at night?”), 
due to false recognition of details and response biases (e.g., Jones & Pipe, 2002; 
Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & Abbott, 2007). Younger children are more 
likely than older children and adults to provide erroneous details in response to 
closed-ended questions (e.g., Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2001, 2004; see Melnyk, 
Crossman, & Scullin, 2007, for a review). 
Suggestive prompts are most problematic because children may change details 
in their accounts and thus respond inconsistently, either by incorporating suggested 
information into their memories of experienced events or acquiescing to perceived 
interviewer coercion (e.g., Eisen, Qin, Goodman, & Davis, 2002; Lamb & Fauchier, 
2001; Orbach & Lamb, 2001). Young children, particularly preschoolers, are more 
susceptible to suggestion than are older children and adults (for reviews see Bruck & 
Ceci, 1999; Bruck, Ceci, & Principe, 2006; London & Kulkofsky, 2010). 
To minimize the risk of eliciting erroneous information, therefore, best-practice 
guidelines for forensic interviewers encourage maximal reliance on free-recall open-
ended prompts, advise against the use of closed-ended ‘yes/no’ questions, and 
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strongly discourage suggestive utterances (APSAC, 2012; Home Office, 2011, section 
3.44; Lamb et al., in press).  
However, there is a fundamental conflict between government policies that aim 
to elicit children’s ‘best-evidence’ and the aims of courtroom questioning in 
adversarial jurisdictions, such as the United States, where the cases examined in the 
present study were conducted (see Spencer & Lamb, 2012). In such adversarial 
jurisdictions, the defence’s cross-examination of witnesses is often deemed to be 
essential. Indeed, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “the 
accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him” and a 
similar provision is outlined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In adversarial jurisdictions attorneys are motivated to undermine the 
opponents’ witnesses, and they question child witnesses accordingly. In particular, 
defence cross-examinations aim to persuade child witnesses to change details in their 
accounts, often by exploiting their developmental limitations and deliberately 
violating guidelines based on research outlining the best ways to elicit truthful 
testimony (see Rush, Quas, & McAuliff, 2012; Spencer & Lamb, 2012). This raises 
serious questions about the extent to which cases are dealt with justly. 
An expanding body of qualitative (e.g., Hayes & Bunting, 2013, Plotnikoff & 
Woolfson, 2009) and laboratory quantitative (e.g. Bettenay, Ridley, Henry, & Crane, 
in press; O’Neill & Zajac, 2013; Righarts, O’Neill, & Zajac, 2013) research has 
explored these issues, motivated in large part by concerns about the ways in which 
alleged victims of child sexual abuse are examined and cross-examined. However, to 
date there have been no large-scale field studies documenting whether and how 
children of different ages respond differently to the questions asked by prosecutors 
and defense attorneys. 
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Types of Questions 
 Several recent studies examining how children are questioned in court have 
been conducted using small numbers of court transcripts from New Zealand (Hanna, 
Davies, Crothers, & Henderson, 2012 [18 cases]; Zajac & Cannan, 2009 [15 cases]; 
Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003 [21 cases]) and the United States (Klemfuss, Quas, & 
Lyon, in press [42 cases]).  Stolzenberg and Lyon (2014) examined 72 cases, but 
limited their focus to questions about child-adult conversations. Although these 
studies have generally found that prosecutors ask more open-ended questions than 
defence attorneys, and defence attorneys ask more suggestive questions than 
prosecutors, there is some inconsistency in results. Whereas Zajac et al. (2003) found 
that prosecutors asked more open-ended questions than closed-ended questions, other 
studies have found that both prosecutors and defence attorneys predominantly asked 
questions that could be answered “yes” or “no.” (Hanna et al., 2012; Klemfuss et al., 
in press; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; Zajac & Cannan, 2009).  Moreover, Hanna et al. 
(2012), Zajac et al. (2003) and Zajac & Cannan (2009) did not distinguish between 
open-ended invitations (e.g., “what happened next?”) and directive questions (e.g., 
“what color was the car?”), and the only study in which different types of open-ended 
questions were distinguished reported no invitations at all (Klemfuss et al., in press).  
Because younger children are generally more susceptible to suggestion and may 
produce shorter and less detailed accounts of experienced events than older children, 
it seems likely that attorneys would ask children of different ages different types of 
questions. However, the results of previous studies have again been somewhat 
inconsistent. Zajac et al. (2003) found no significant differences associated with 
children’s ages and the types of questions used by both prosecutors and defence 
attorneys.  Klemfuss et al. (in press) unexpectedly found that, with age, there was a 
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significant decrease in the use of option-posing questions and an increase in the use of 
suggestive questions. In contrast, Stolzenberg and Lyon (2014) found that attorneys 
were slightly more likely to ask younger children yes-no questions.  
The reason for the differences among studies is unclear.  The studies were 
conducted in California and New Zealand, but because the findings were sometimes 
inconsistent between studies in the same jurisdiction, jurisdictional differences are 
clearly not sufficient to account for the inconsistencies.  We suspected that they were 
attributable to methodological differences and to the small numbers of cases included 
in previous studies.  The small sample sizes might have been especially problematic 
with respect to age-of-child differences.  
Children’s Responses 
Little research has focused on children’s responsiveness to attorney’s questions. 
In research of this sort, responsiveness refers to the child’s willingness to 
acknowledge and attempt to engage with the question posed, either by narrowly 
responding to the question or by providing more information than was technically 
requested. By contrast, unresponsiveness would involve not answering or proving a 
response unrelated to the question asked.  Research on forensic interviews has shown 
that children who make allegations of abuse are responsive to almost all the questions 
addressed to them (REFS).  Children appear to be responsive in the courtroom, too. 
Klemfuss et al. (in press) found that child witnesses were more often responsive than 
unresponsive and that, with increasing age, children elaborated more (i.e., provided 
more information than was requested, for example in response to yes/no questions) in 
response to prosecutors’ questions than defense attorneys’ questions. Older children 
elaborated more in response to open-ended directive and closed-ended option-posing 
questions than did younger children, but there were no such differences with respect 
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to suggestive questions.  Unfortunately, the actual age range was unspecified, 
although the children averaged 12 years old. 
There is considerable concern about the extent to which testifying children 
might contradict themselves in court.  Many laboratory analogue studies that can 
establish the accuracy of children’s responses have shown that children are more 
likely to change their correct responses when cross-examined suggestively than when 
questions are simply repeated (e.g., Jack & Zajac, in press; Fogliati & Bussey, 2014; 
Zajac & Hayne, 2003). For example, Fogliati and Bussey (2014) interviewed 120 5- 
and 7-year-old children twice about a staged transgression. All children first 
underwent a direct-examination and then either a second direct- or cross-examination 
immediately afterwards. Children interviewed by the researchers in the direct/direct 
condition were equally accurate in the two interviews, whereas children in the 
direct/cross condition were significantly less accurate when cross-examined. 
Although some researchers have also shown that, consistent with the suggestibility 
literature, these effects are stronger for younger than for older children (e.g., Bettenay 
et al., in press; Zajac & Hayne, 2006), Fogliati and Bussey (2014) reported no age 
differences in the number of errors elicited in cross-examinations, perhaps because 
the age difference between the groups was so small.  
Much less is known about age differences in children’s responses to direct- and 
cross-examination questions in real court cases in which children were questioned 
about personally significant and emotionally salient events.  In New Zealand, Zajac et 
al. (2003) found that, regardless of age, children made no changes to their earlier 
statements in response to questions from prosecutors. However, 76% of the children 
made changes under cross-examination, with 95% of these changes made in response 
to leading or credibility-challenging prompts. Moreover, Zajac and Cannan (2009) 
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reported that both child and adult complainants were more likely to change their 
statements in response to questions from the defence than the prosecution. All of the 
adults and 93% of the children made at least one change to their earlier statements 
during cross-examination. Zajac and Cannan (2009) did not report the percentage of 
cases in which prosecutors elicited self-contradictions.  
As noted above, previous studies (e.g., Klemfluss et al., in press; Zajac & 
Cannan, 2009; Zajac et al., 2003) have yielded inconsistent findings regarding the 
effects of children’s ages on the ways in which they are questioned in court and it is 
not clear whether children of different ages are more likely to change their answers 
when questioned, probably because the studies have involved very small samples. 
Zajac et al. (2003), for example, were only able to compare 10 children who were 
under 10 years of age with 11 who were 10 and over.  In addition, studies that analyze 
self-contradictions (i.e., Zajac & Cannan, 2009; Zajac et al., 2003) have been 
conducted exclusively in New Zealand where pre-recorded forensic interviews 
comprise the bulk of children’s direct testimonies. Since the researchers did not have 
access to the forensic interviews, they were unable to identify self-contradictions in 
which the child’s in-court testimony contradicted statements in the forensic interview.   
Present Study 
The current study was designed to investigate how and whether different 
questions types were associated with witness responses and self-contradictions in a 
large sample of Californian criminal trial transcripts involving 120 children aged 6 to 
12 years.  Specifically, child age and attorney role (prosecution/defence) were 
examined in relation to (1) the types of questions asked, (2) children’s responsiveness, 
and (3) the frequency of self-contradictions. Self-contradictions were then further 
analyzed in relation to the proportions of question types that elicited self-
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contradictions. Based on the research reviewed above, it was predicted that: I) 
attorneys would use more closed-ended than open-ended questions, II) defence 
attorneys would be more likely than prosecutors to use suggestive prompts, III) these 
effects would be more detrimental for younger children than for older children, IV) 
defence attorneys would be more likely than prosecutors to elicit self-contradictions 
(because they used more suggestive questions), and V) suggestive prompts would be 
more likely than any other question type to elicit self-contradictions.  
Method 
 
Sample 
Transcripts of 106 trials involving 120 alleged victims of child sexual abuse 
were included in the study. These were selected from a larger set of 223 transcripts 
drawn from all felony child sexual abuse cases involving female victims under the age 
of 18 that went to trial to Los Angeles County between 1997 and 2001.  We examined 
all cases that involved children aged 12 and under at the time of trial.  The trials 
involved 68 different prosecutors and 88 different defence attorneys.  
Children reported single (n = 43) or multiple (n = 77) sexually abusive 
experiences involving penetration (n = 53), touching under clothes (n = 37), touching 
over clothes (n = 21) and indecent exposure (n = 9). The final sample included 98 
girls and 22 boys who were categorized on the basis of age at the time of trial into 2 
groups: 6- to 9-year-olds (n = 54) and 10- to 12-year-olds (n = 66). No information 
was available concerning the children’s socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds. 
All defendants were male. In 90% (n = 108) of the cases, the alleged abusers 
were known to the children. The suspects were biological parents (n = 10), step-
fathers/mothers’ boyfriends (n = 23), other family members (n = 24), family friends 
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(n = 23), acquaintances (n = 28) and strangers (n = 12). Defendants were either 
convicted (n = 89) or acquitted (n = 25). The remaining 6 cases resulted in mistrials.  
Coding of Transcripts 
The transcripts contained direct and often redirect examinations, in which the 
prosecution questioned the children, and cross and often recross examinations, in 
which the defence questioned the children. Only the substantive question-response 
pairs were coded.  Substantive utterances were defined as those designed to elicit 
information about what happened during the alleged incidents, what immediately 
preceded the alleged incidents, within-incident interventions (e.g., unexpected 
interruptions exposing the abuse), and other features of the abuse (e.g., how long the 
incidents lasted, where they happened). Children’s substantive responses contained 
incident-related information. Non-substantive prompts that aimed to inform child 
witnesses about the purpose of the court proceedings, provide details about the 
examination procedure and build rapport were not included. By definition, children’s 
non-substantive responses did not contain incident-related information and were also 
not included.  
Attorneys’ questions.  Attorneys’ questions were categorized into one of the 
four main categories that are commonly used to differentiate between interviewer 
utterances in forensic interviews (e.g., Lamb et al., 2008). Examples of each type are 
provided in Table 1.  
1. Invitations. Open-ended, input-free utterances used to elicit free-recall 
responses from children. Such questions, statements, imperatives, or 
contextual cues do not restrict the child’s focus except in a general sense. 
Invitations can also follow-up on information just mentioned, or cue for 
additional free-recall elaboration about details previously mentioned.  
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2. Directive prompts. Open-ended questions that refocus the child on aspects or 
details of the allegation that they have previously mentioned, mostly using 
‘WH’ utterances to request further information. 
3. Option-posing prompts. Closed-ended questions that refocus the child’s 
attention on details of the allegation that they have not previously mentioned, 
although without implying an expected response. They can be formulated as 
“yes/no” or “choice” questions.  
4. Suggestive prompts. Closed-ended statements or questions formulated in a 
way that communicates the expected response. They may introduce 
information not mentioned by the child but assumed by the attorney or query 
the truthfulness of the child’s response.  
Children’s responsiveness. Children’s responsiveness was categorized 
exhaustively into one of two categories. Examples of each category are provided in 
Table 1.  
1. Responsive. Verbal and action responses related to the attorney’s previous 
utterance. Utterances were assigned this category even if they did not contain 
new informative details, or when their meaning was unclear. For example, the 
response “I don’t know” would be responsive.   
2. Unresponsive. Responses that do not relate to the question asked in the 
previous attorney utterance, but provide incident-related information. These 
include instances when children misunderstood the attorneys’ questions. 
Self-contradictions. Self-contradictions were defined as responses that negated 
what the children had previously disclosed during the proceedings or provided self-
conflicting information (see Table 1).  
Interrater Reliability  
RESONSIVENESS	  AND	  SELF-­‐CONTRADICTIONS	   14	  
Another rater independently coded 20% of the transcripts that were randomly 
selected. Inter-rater reliability in the classification of question types was high, K = .91 
(SE = .01), 95% CI [.89, .93], as was the agreement when coding children’s 
responsiveness, K = .91 (SE = .01), 95% CI [.89, .93]. The agreement when 
identifying self-contradictions in children’s responses was also high, K = .83 (SE = 
.05), 95% CI [.73, .93]. Reliability assessments were performed throughout the 
duration of coding and all disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Results 
A total of 48,716 substantive question-response pairs (M = 406.97, SD = 
338.92) were identified.  Prosecutors’ examinations ranged in length from 29 to 1430 
substantive question-response pairs (n = 26,548, M = 221.23, SD = 193.29), whereas 
defence attorneys’ examination ranged in length from 7 to 1378 substantive question-
response pairs (n = 22,168, M = 184.73, SD = 179.51). There was a significant 
correlation between the length of the prosecutors’ and defence attorneys’ 
examinations, r (118) = .64, p < .01. 
A one-way Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) revealed no 
association between the age of the children (6- to 9- and 10- to 12-year-olds) and the 
length of the prosecutors’ examinations, F (1, 118) = 2.76, p = .10, Λ = .02, or the 
defence attorneys’ examinations, F (1, 118) = .08, p = .08, Λ = .78.  Hereafter, 
proportional values are used in order to control for the total number of questions the 
prosecutors and defence attorneys asked.  
Attorneys’ Questions 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for proportions of question types used by 
prosecution and defence attorneys.  
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A Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance (RM-ANOVA) was conducted to 
assess the difference between the types of questions asked (repeated-measures; 
proportions of questions that were invitations, directives, option-posing and 
suggestive prompts) and attorneys’ role (repeated-measures; prosecution and 
defence), and whether this effect differed depending on the age of the children 
(between-subjects; 6- to 9- and 10- to 12-year-olds). The analyses revealed a 
significant main effect for the different types of questions asked, F (1.8, 210.4) = 
872.91, p < .001, η2p = .88, which was qualified by a significant interaction between 
the types of questions prosecution or defence attorneys asked, F (1.8, 210.4) = 
281.51, p < .001, η2p = .71. There was a significant interaction between the types of 
questions asked and age, F (1.8, 210.4) = 3.73, p = .03, η2p = .03. Examination of the 
means suggested that 6- to 9-year-olds were asked more option posing questions (M = 
.51, SD = .01) than 10- to 12-year-olds (M = .47, SD = .01) and fewer suggestive 
questions (M = .15, SD = .01) than 10- to 12-year-olds (M = .41, SD = .01). The 
means for invitations (M = .02, SD = .00) and directives (M = .21, SD = .01) were the 
same for 6- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 12-year-olds. However, none of the differences 
were statistically significant after Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons 
(adjusted alpha level = .006). There were no other significant main or interaction 
effects. 
A simple effects analysis was calculated to follow-up the attorney by question 
type interaction. Prosecutors were significantly more likely to use invitations, F (1, 
119) = 121.84, p < .001, η2p = .55, directive questions, F (1, 119) = 1761.25, p < .001, 
η2p = .94, and option-posing questions, F (1, 119) = 4645.39, p < .001, η2p = .98, than 
defence attorneys.  On the other hand, defence attorneys were significantly more 
likely to use suggestive questions than prosecutors, F (1, 119) = 1491.88, p < .001, η2p 
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= .93 (see Table 2). Although prosecutors’ questions were less suggestive than 
defence attorneys’, a majority of the prosecutors’ questions were nevertheless option-
posing, and only 3% of their questions were invitations. 
Children’s Responsiveness 
A one-way RM-ANOVA was conducted to assess the difference between 
children’s responsiveness (proportion of answers that were unresponsive) to 
attorneys’ (repeated-measures; prosecution and defence) questions, and whether this 
effect differed depending on the age of the children (between-subjects; 6- to 9- and 
10- to 12-year-olds). The results revealed a significant main effect for children’s 
responsiveness, F (1, 118) = 5.23, p = .02, η2p = .04, but no significant interactions 
involving age.  Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons (adjusted alpha level = .025) 
indicated that children were significantly more likely to be unresponsive to defence 
attorneys (M = .02, SD = .03) than to prosecutors (M = .01, SD = .02).  
 Two separate RM-ANOVAs were conducted for prosecutors and defence 
attorneys to assess whether any types of questions were associated with greater 
responsiveness. Importantly, both tests revealed no significant differences.  
Self-contradictions 
In total, 2093 self-contradictions were identified, with children contradicting 
themselves in 114 (95%) of the cases. Self-contradictions were identified in 103 
(85.83%) of the examinations by prosecutors and 109 (90.83%) of the examinations 
by defence attorneys. In response to prosecutors, 664 (M = 5.53, SD = 6.16, range 0 – 
40) self-contradictions occurred, while 1429 (M = 11.91, SD = 12.91, range 0 – 71) 
self-contradictions occurred in response to defence attorneys’ questions.  A paired 
samples t-test showed that the defence attorneys elicited significantly more self-
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contradictions (M = .06, SD = .04), than prosecutors (M = .02, SD = .02), t (119) = 
9.67, p < .001, r = .66, 95% CI [.03, .04].  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for proportions of question types that 
elicited self-contradictions. All substantive questions were included in the analyses.  
A two-way RM-ANOVA was conducted to assess whether any type of question 
(repeated-measures; invitations, directives, option-posing and suggestive prompts) 
was disproportionately likely to elicit self-contradictions, and whether this effect 
differed depending on the age of the children (between-subjects; 6- to 9- and 10- to 
12-year-olds). Attorney role was not included in the analysis to maximise statistical 
power.   The analyses revealed a significant main effect for the proportions of self-
contradictions associated with the different question types, F (1.8, 194.78) = 39.09, p 
< .001, η2p = .27. There were no significant interactions involving age. 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons (adjusted alpha level = .0125) indicated that 
there were no significant differences between the proportion of invitations and 
directive prompts and the proportion of invitations and option-posing prompts that 
resulted in self-contradictions. On the other hand, option-posing prompts were 
significantly more likely to elicit self-contradictions than directive prompts. 
Suggestive prompts were significantly more likely to elicit self-contradictions than 
invitations, directive, and option-posing prompts (see Table 3).  
Discussion 
Because children and adults have different developmental capacities and 
limitations (Lamb et al., in press), and because judges and jurors often place a strong 
emphasis on consistency when assessing the veracity of oral testimony (e.g., Bruer & 
Pozzulo, in press; Home Office, 2011; Semmler & Brewer, 2002), it is vital to 
understand what questions can safely be posed to children by both the prosecution and 
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the defence without obstructing the course of justice. This study systematically 
examined, in 120 court cases, the types of questions child witnesses were asked in 
court, how their responsiveness and consistency were affected by the types of 
questions asked, and whether this differed depending on their ages and the identity of 
the attorney (prosecutor or defence).  The sample was sample several times larger 
than previous research, and was the first to examine children’s self-contradictions in 
American courtroom testimony. 
Key Findings 
Prosecutors were significantly more likely than defence attorneys to use 
invitations, directives and option-posing prompts, whereas defence attorneys were 
significantly more likely than prosecutors to use suggestive prompts. These results are 
consistent with previous reports that prosecutors are significantly more likely to use 
open-ended prompts than defence attorneys and that defence attorneys are 
significantly more likely to use suggestive prompts than prosecutors.   
However, the results highlight the fact that the problems children face in court 
are not merely attributable to cross-examination by defence attorneys.  Prosecutors 
used more closed-ended than open-ended prompts, were most likely to use option-
posing prompts, and virtually never used invitations.  These results are consistent with 
research examining smaller samples of U.S. court transcripts (Klemfuss et al., in 
press; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014).  They appear inconsistent with research (in a New 
Zealand sample) that found that prosecutors’ questions are predominantly open-ended 
(Zajac et al., 2003), but consistent with subsequent research in New Zealand finding 
that prosecutors used predominantly closed-ended questions (Hanna et al., 2012; 
Zajac & Cannan, 2009).  Moreover, they highlight the value of distinguishing 
between invitations, which have been found to be highly productive in eliciting details 
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from children, and directives, which are less productive (Lamb et al., 2008).  When 
invitations are separately analysed in the court transcripts, they are virtually non-
existent. 
Both prosecutors and defence attorneys elicited a substantial number of 
inconsistencies.  Although self-contradictions were quite rare as a percentage of 
questions asked, all but six of the children contradicted themselves at least once, 85% 
in response to prosecutors’ questions and 90% in response to defence attorneys.  
There were an average of 5.53 (range 0-40) and 11.91 (range 0-71) self-contradictions 
in the direct- and cross-examinations, respectively. Previous studies have similarly 
shown that most children provide some inconsistent responses when questioned in 
court and that more inconsistencies occur in response to defence attorneys than 
prosecutors (Zajac & Cannan, 2009; Zajac et al., 2003), but self-contradictions in 
response to prosecutors’ questions were much more common in this study. Zajac et al. 
(2003) reported no self-contradictions in response to prosecutors and a range of 1-16 
self-contradictions (M = 3.56) in response to defence attorneys. Zajac and Cannan 
(2009) reported an average of 1.03 and 5.03 self-contradictions in the direct- and 
cross-examinations, respectively, with an absolute range of 0-20. They noted that 
defence attorneys elicited self-contradictions in 93% of the cases, but did not report 
the percentage of cases in which prosecutors did so.  
These discrepancies are perhaps explained by differences in the length of the 
transcripts examined. Both direct- and cross-examinations in the present study were 
much longer on average than those analysed by Zajac and Cannan (2009) and Zajac et 
al (2003). Direct-examinations in particular were longer, probably because New 
Zealand prosecutors rely to a large extent on children’s videotaped statements. Since 
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the authors did not have access to those videotapes, they could not determine the 
extent that children’s in-court testimony contradicted their videotaped testimony.  
Suggestive questioning places pressure on children to reconsider and change 
their previous responses. As in this study, research in experimental (e.g., Jack & 
Zajac, in press; Fogliati & Bussey, in press; Zajac & Hayne, 2003) and forensic 
settings (Zajac et al., 2003) shows that children are most likely to change their 
answers when questioned using closed-ended suggestive prompts. Indeed, in the 
present study, closed-ended suggestive questions were more likely to elicit self-
contradictions than closed-ended option-posing prompts, open-ended directives and 
invitations, while option-posing questions were more likely to elicit self-
contradictions than directive questions.   
The larger sample in this study enabled us to sensitively assess age differences.  
Nevertheless, attorneys did not appear to adjust their questioning to accommodate 
younger children, as neither question type nor length of examination varied by age.   
Surprisingly, children’s performance did not appear to vary by age.  There were no 
age differences in children’s responsiveness, nor in the proportion of self-
contradictions elicited regardless of the types of questions asked.   
Limitations 
Several limitations should be noted.  First, we were unable to determine the 
veracity of the allegations or of children’s specific responses.  However, self-
contradictions of necessity constitute false responding, since the contradictory 
answers cannot both be correct, and our finding that suggestive questions were most 
likely to elicit self-contradictions is consistent with laboratory research demonstrating 
that suggestive questions are most likely to elicit errors.   
Second, all of the cases were tried in a single county 12-17 years ago. Attorneys 
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questioning techniques may vary by jurisdiction and change over time.  However, Los 
Angeles County is the most populous county in the United States, as well as highly 
diverse, socioeconomically and ethnically.  Because the McMartin daycare case was 
tried in Los Angeles, attorneys would certainly have been well aware of current 
concerns regarding the suggestibility of children.  Furthermore, there is little evidence 
that attorneys’ questions have improved over time.  Hanna et al. (2012), who found 
that both prosecutors and defense attorneys in New Zealand asked predominantly 
closed-ended questions, noted that their results, utilizing transcripts from 2008, were 
similar to Davies & Seymour (1998), who examined transcripts from cases tried in 
1994. 
Third, we did not measure the complexity of the questions, an issue that has 
been emphasized in prior research examining children’s difficulties with cross-
examination (Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac et al., 2009; Zajac & Hayne, 2003).  
Complexity may interact with age, attorney, and question-type in affecting 
responsiveness and self-contradiction.  However, Evans et al. (2009), examining 46 4- 
to 15-year-olds’ testimony in Los Angeles cases, did not find any age or attorney 
differences in either wordiness or the syntactic complexity of the questions.  
Similarly, although Zajac et al. (2009) found that adults were asked more complex 
questions than children, Zajac and Hayne (2003) found no relation between age and 
complexity among 5- to 13-year-olds.  And although Zajac et al. (2009) found that 
defense attorneys asked more of one type of complex questions than prosecutors, the 
differences with respect to child witnesses were quite small; 31% of defense 
attorneys’ questions were complex, but so were 25% of prosecutors.  Similarly, 
Hanna et al. (2012) found that prosecutors and defense attorneys significantly differed 
in complexity in only one of five types examined.  Hence, we think it unlikely that the 
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results are confounded by complexity. 
Nevertheless, the point that researchers should consider more than question-type 
is well-taken.   For example, peripheral details relating to the alleged victim’s 
thoughts and feelings may be more emotionally salient and susceptible to suggestion 
than central details relating to the sexually abusive actions.   Furthermore, when 
interpreting self-contradictions, acquiescence to suggestion may be driven as much by 
the content of the question as by the type of question. For example, the first example 
of a self-contradiction provided in Table 1 is a question about numerosity, which is 
inherently difficult for children (Wandrey, Quas, & Lyon, 2012), and the child may be 
confusing within-event numerosity (e.g., the alleged abuse occurred once on that 
particular occasion) with between-event numerosity (e.g., the alleged abuse occurred 
on 5 separate occasions).  It is also impossible, when focusing on self-contradictions 
to know which question was problematic and which answer (if any) was accurate. In 
Table 1, for example, the first question in the first example of a self-contradiction is 
suggestive and the second question is directive. Perhaps the initial question was 
problematic while the contradiction-eliciting question elicited an answer that was 
closer to the truth. Indeed, contradiction-eliciting questions during cross-examination 
may increase testimonial accuracy if the child’s initial report was untrue.  Future work 
in the field should examine specific problems with question content, and link those 
findings to laboratory work on question content and children’s accuracy.  
Implications 
In the United States, as in most other western jurisdictions, defendants have the 
right to challenge the evidence against them. It is well established that the use of 
closed-ended questions, and in particular suggestive utterances, increase the risk of 
eliciting erroneous information (e.g., APSAC, 2012; Home Office, 2011, section 3.44; 
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Lamb et al., in press). However, there is a fundamental conflict between best-practice 
guidelines and the aims of cross-examination questioning techniques that are 
concerned not with eliciting evidence but with testing it (Zajac, O’Neill, & Hayne, 
2012). 
There are currently very limited guidelines about how attorneys should question 
children in court. The guidance that does exist is neither well embraced nor well 
informed (Spencer & Lamb, 2012).  Attorneys should be given more detailed advice 
concerning the most appropriate ways of questioning children in courtroom settings. 
Specifically, attorneys should abide by best-practice guidelines that are sensitive to 
children’s limitations and competencies and strongly discourage the use of suggestive 
questions. 
Recently, evidence-based “Toolkits” (see Advocacy Training Council (ATC), 
2011) have been introduced to provide continuing education and thus improve 
practice in England and Wales. Launched in 2013 on The Advocate’s Gateway, 
Toolkits are now a core element of training and were endorsed in the Lord Chief 
Justice’s Criminal Practice Directions (2013).  It is essential that the training is 
systematically assessed to ensure that practice is indeed improved.  
A continuing challenge is how to protect children from distress and 
developmentally inappropriate, misleading and confusing questions, whilst also 
protecting the defendants’ rights to challenge their accusers. Best-practice guidelines 
for the questioning of child witnesses in court must allow the veracity of children’s 
testimony to be evaluated without exploiting their developmental capacities.  Future 
research should focus on the development of new interventions (e.g., O’Neill & 
Zajac, 2013; Righarts et al., 2013; see also Zajac et al., 2012) that are sensitive to 
children’s developmental limitations and competencies but also protect the 
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defendants’ right to fair trials.  
Conclusion  
The present study supports findings from previous research that suggestive 
questions adversely affect the consistency of children’s responses and that these 
problems are more serious when defence attorneys question children. However, both 
prosecutors and defence attorneys asked predominantly closed-ended questions, 
prosecutors elicited a substantial number of self-contradictions, and neither 
prosecutors nor defence attorneys were sensitive to children’s developmental 
differences.    
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Table 1 
 
Question Types and Responses  
 
 
 
Code 
 
Examples 
 
 
Invitation 
 
“Tell us what happened.” 
“Earlier you mentioned (person/object/action). Tell me more about 
that.” 
“Then what happened?” 
“Tell me everything that happened after you got on the bed.”  
(when “I got on the bed” was previously mentioned by the child) 
 
Directive “How did he touch you?” (when “he touched me” was previously 
mentioned by the child) 
“What type of top were you wearing?” (when “wearing a top” was 
previously mentioned by the child) 
“Where were you when that happened?” 
“What colour was the inside of the car?” 
 
Option-posing “Did he make you swallow anything?” 
“When he touched you on your penis, did he do that one time or more 
than one time?” (when “touched my penis” was previously mentioned 
by the child) 
“Did he touch your arm or did he touch you somewhere else?” (when 
“he touched me” was previously mentioned by the child) 
 
Suggestive “Now, that’s not what you told the police, of course, is it? You told 
the police something a lot different, didn’t you?” 
“Did you tell a lie when you answered, no, he didn’t put his finger in 
your butt?”  
 “Are you sure about that?” 
 “After he took your pants and panties off, what happened?” (when 
the child had previously said “I took my pants and panties off”)  
 
 
 
Responsive 
 
Attorney: “Do you remember what room of the house you were in 
when it happened?” Child: “The living room.” 
Attorney: “Can you stand up and point?” Child: (indicating).  
Attorney: “When you turned around the man was running away?” 
Child: “Yes.” 
 
Unresponsive Attorney: “What did he say?” Child: “I was – I said “STOP” and I 
tried to push him away from me, but he kept holding on to my waist.” 
Attorney: “Well that can’t be right, can it? Try again. Was he 
standing or sitting?” Child: “He licked my private, too”.  
 
 
 
Self-
contradiction 
 
Attorney: “He licked you one time?” Child: “Yes.” (later in the 
proceedings) Attorney: “How many times did he lick you?” Child: “I 
don’t know - like 5 times”. 
Attorney: “Did he touch your privates when you were in the car?” 
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Child: “No.” Attorney: “But I thought he did touch you in the car. 
Did he touch your privates in the car?” Child: “No. I never - in the 
car he touched my privates.” 
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Table 2 
Proportions of Question Types  
 
 
 
Prosecution 
 
 
 
Defence 
 
Question type 
 
   
M 
 
SD  
 
M 
   
 SD 
 
Invitation 
 
.03 
 
.03  
 
.00 
 
.01 
 
Directive 
 
.29 
 
.08  
 
.13 
 
.06 
 
Option-posing 
 
.52 
 
.08  
 
.46 
 
.12 
 
Suggestive 
 
 
.16 
 
.06  
 
.42 
 
.14 
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Table 3 
Proportions of Question Types that Elicited Self-contradictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
 
 
Self-
contradictions 
 
 
Question type 
 
   
M 
 
SD 
 
Invitation 
 
.02 
 
.09 
 
Directive 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
Option-posing 
 
.03 
 
.02 
 
Suggestive 
 
 
.08 
 
.06 
